Why Has UK Net Immigration Increased? by Timothy Hatton
CENTRE FOR  
ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH 
 











DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 457 
December 2002  
 


















ISBN: 0 7315 3527 8 
Acknowledgements: 
I am grateful to Tom Clark, Drew Treasure, and Margi Wood for help with data. I would like to acknowledge the 
financial support of a British Academy Research Readership and the hospitality of the Economics Program, Research 
School of Social Sciences at the ANU2. Timothy J. Hatton, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Colchester, 
UK, hatton@essex.ac.uk    
  ii   
CONTENTS 
   Page 
Abstract iii 
Introduction 1 
Trends in International Migration  2 
Immigration Policies at Home and Abroad  4 
Migration and Selection  8 
Data  10 
Immigration of Foreign Citizens  12 
Emigration of British Citizens  14 
Why has Net Immigration Increased?  16 
Conclusion 17 
References 20 
Tables   22 
Figures 28 
    
  iii   
ABSTRACT 
 
Since the 1970s Britain has gone from being a country of net emigration to one of net 
immigration, with a trend increase in the net balance of about 100,000 per year. This paper 
represents the first attempt comprehensively to model the variations in net migration for 
British and for foreign citizens, across countries and over time. A simple economic model, 
which includes the selection effects of differing income distributions at home and abroad, 
largely accounts for the variations in the data. The results suggest that improved economic 
performance in the UK relative to overseas has tended to increase immigration. But a more 
important influence, especially on the reduced out-migration of British citizens, has been 
growing UK inequality. By contrast, shifts in immigration policies at home and abroad seem 







 Introduction  
  In the last 20 years the UK has become a country of net immigration. Over the 
long term, the net balance of international migration has moved from an average 
annual outflow of 50 thousand in the 1960s and 1970s to an inflow of 50 thousand in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Recent trends are even more dramatic. From a low point of 35 
thousand per year in the early 1990s, net immigration has soared to 178 thousand in 
1998. In recent years net immigration to the UK has even surpassed that of traditional 
countries of immigration. In 1998 it easily exceeded the total for Canada and Australia 
combined.  Although immigration has long been a policy issue, until recently these 
trends have received remarkably little attention.
1 And there has been no formal 
analysis of the forces that have combined to produce them.  
So why has UK net immigration increased so dramatically? On one view it is 
simply the result of immigration policies at home and abroad and is therefore chosen 
by policymakers. But evidence for other countries shows that a good deal of the 
variation in immigration can be explained by economic forces.
2 This paper is the first 
attempt to provide a set of econometric estimates to explain migration flows between 
Britain and the relevant source or destination countries.  The flows are explained in 
part by the usual economic variables such as business cycles and per capita incomes at 
home and abroad. A key finding is that changing income distribution also matters and 
that growing inequality in Britain accounts for a significant share of the recent rise in 
net immigration. Although these effects are filtered through immigration policies in 
Britain and abroad, shifts in policy seem not to have been very important.  
  The following section outlines the trends and composition of migration to and 
from Britain. This is followed by a summary of immigration policies at home and 
abroad and then by a discussion of incentives and selectivity in the decision to 
migrate. After outlining the data sources, the subsequent sections report random 
effects panel estimates, for the flows of foreign citizens and of British citizens, to and 
from a variety of destinations. Finally, an attempt is made to decompose the 
influences that account for trends in total net immigration, both in the long-run and in 
                                                            
1   For a survey of issues relating to UK international migration, see Hatton and Wheatley Price 
(1999). Recent trends and policy issues are discussed in Glover et. al. (2001) 
2   Recent studies include Cobb-Clark and Conolly (1997) for Australia, Karemera et. al. (2000) 
for the United States and Canada, and Karras and Chiswick (1999) for Germany. Other studies are 
summarised by Bauer and Zimmermann (1999).   2 
the short-run. The paper concludes with some comments on past trends in net 
migration and speculations about the future.  
 
Trends in International Migration  
The only comprehensive statistics on international migration for Britain come 
from the International Passenger Survey (IPS) which has been taken in its present 
form since 1964. It is derived from a sample of travellers to and from the United 
Kingdom surveyed at airports, seaports and the channel tunnel. The published figures, 
which are grossed up from this stratified sample, are regarded as reasonably reliable 
although they are subject to sampling error. Migrants are defined in the IPS as those 
who are entering (or leaving) for an intended period of at least a year, after at least a 
year abroad (or in Britain).  But the statistics exclude movements to and from the Irish 
Republic (under the common travel area), and they exclude a significant proportion of 
asylum seekers and 'switchers'--those who enter as short-term migrants and either 
change their status or overstay. The survey is discussed further below. 
  Trends in the IPS net immigration figures can be seen in Figure 1. The long-
term increase in net immigration (the bold line) displays short run fluctuations around 
a clear upward trend. From the early 1980s the long-term pattern of net emigration 
turns into net immigration. But, as is widely recognized, the IPS data underestimate 
net immigration and the OPCS adjusts the overall net immigration balance to take 
account of this. Adjusted net immigration (the dotted line) exceeds the IPS figure by 
about 40 thousand per year between 1985 and 1998. As a result of this correction, 
cumulative net immigration since 1985 amounts to well over a million rather than just 
over half a million. In the early postwar decades those omitted from the figures were 
mainly net in-migrants from Ireland but the trend towards out-migration of Irish 
citizens has been counter-balanced by the growth in asylum seekers and visa 
switchers. 
  Figure 1 also shows (unadjusted) net immigration divided between British 
citizens and foreign citizens. Most of the fall in net emigration before the 1980s was 
due to declining out-migration of British citizens. Since then the trend has been 
relatively flat. By contrast, the net immigration balance of foreign citizens drifted 
downwards very mildly until the early 1990s, when it was sharply reversed. From the 
trough in 1993 to 1998, net immigration of foreign citizens grew by 110 thousand--the  3 
most dramatic increase during the entire postwar period. The reasons for this sudden 
surge in immigration, against a background of tight immigration policies, have been 
little explored.  
  The IPS data divides the flows of migrants by country, or region, of next or 
last residence. Table 1 shows the direction of net flows over recent decades for British 
and foreign citizens combined. The decline in net emigration to "Old Commonwealth" 
countries reflects, in part, the long-term decline in net out-migration of British citizens 
shown in Figure 1. For Australia and Canada net out-migration since the 1970s has 
decreased dramatically while for New Zealand and South Africa it has become a net 
inflow. It is notable that there has been no upward trend in net immigration from the 
New Commonwealth, either from the Indian subcontinent, from Africa, or from the 
Caribbean. Among non-Commonwealth countries there has been a strong upward 
trend in net immigration from Europe, particularly the European Union. But there is 
little evidence of increases in net immigration from elsewhere. Overall, the rise in net 
immigration has come from the relatively developed OECD countries, rather than 
from the third world. Roughly the same applies to the surge from 1993 to 1998--85 
percent of which is accounted for by the Old Commonwealth, Europe and the United 
States. 
  Net immigration represents the difference between much larger gross flows in 
both directions. As Table 2 shows, in the 1990s the net immigration balance was less 
than one fifth of gross immigration, just as in the 1970s net emigration was about a 
fifth of gross emigration. The overall change in the balance was driven largely by a 
decline in the gross emigration of British citizens and a rise in the gross inflow of 
foreign citizens. The substantial inflows of British citizens, and outflows of foreign 
citizens, reflect the fact that many migrants are relatively short-term stayers. In the 
decade 1989-98, 63 percent of immigrants and 69 percent of emigrants were intending 
to stay for more than three years, and the numbers intending to stay for more than four 
years were 46 percent of immigrants and 53 percent of emigrants. It seems likely that 
these flows, particularly among returning migrants (who would not face immigration 
controls), will be sensitive to economic conditions.   
  Not all migrants are workers; many come (or leave) as part of the family of a 
worker or for other reasons such as education. The IPS records the age, sex and 
economic status of immigrants and emigrants. Table 3 shows the net balance of these  4 
various categories over recent decades. Net immigration of females tends to exceed 
that of males and the overall growth in net immigration is largely due to a rise in net 
immigration in the 15-24 age range and fall in net emigration among those aged 25-
44. Among adults (those aged 15 and over) there is substantial net immigration of 
those described as students and significant increase in non-occupied adults. The non-
worker categories, including the under 15's, represented 47 percent of the gross inflow 
and 43 percent of the gross outflow in the decade 1989-98. Of course many of them 
would subsequently become workers, a point which is reflected especially by the 
persistent net inflow of students.
3  
  The IPS records the occupations of immigrants and emigrants but these are 
presented only in two broad categories: professional or managerial and manual or 
clerical. Over the last three decades, net emigration turned into net immigration in 
both categories and in the 1990s the net inflow of "skilled" workers was nearly double 
the net inflow of "unskilled" (Table 3). But changes in the net balance hide the fact 
that both immigration and emigration have become more skilled. As Figure 2 shows, 
the percentage of professional and managerial among worker immigrants rose from 40 
percent in 1971 to 61 percent in 1998, and their share among emigrants rose even 
more. This change in the skill structure is an important characteristic of the overall 
trend in migration. It seems likely that this was due to three things. First, there is the 
general rise in skills among the workforce at home and abroad. Second there has been  
increasing skill selectivity of immigration policies in countries receiving British 
immigrants, which have reduced the opportunities for unskilled British workers to 
emigrate. And third, mildly skill-selective policies in Britain have been combined 
with increasing incentives for skilled immigrants, as reflected in the widening income 
distribution. 
    
 
Immigration Policies at Home and Abroad   
  British immigration policy is governed by the Immigration Act of 1971, and 
subsequent modifications. Immigration control is administered by the Home Office 
                                                            
3   Some of those who arrived as students would have joined the UK labour force on the 
completion of their studies. But it also seems likely that some of those who returned would have given 
their future or intended occupations, rather than describing themselves as students.   5 
Immigration and Nationality Department, although work permits are issued by 
Overseas Labour Service of the Department for Education and Employment.
4 Irish 
citizens and nationals of European Economic Area countries are essentially free to 
live and work in Britain. Commonwealth citizens with right of abode, those who have 
British passports, and those who have acquired indefinite leave to enter or remain also 
have the right of free entry.
5 
  Those not otherwise entitled to work in Britain are required to have a work 
permit, applied for by a prospective employer. The number of work permits is not 
subject to an overall quota but permits are issued according to the level of 
qualification or for specific occupations in demand. Work permits are granted initially 
for four years but with the possibility of renewal for a fixed term or the granting of 
indefinite right to remain. The right to work is also available on a short- term basis to 
groups such as business people, journalists, diplomats, sports people and entertainers. 
Short-term work permits are also issued under a variety of schemes for working 
holiday-makers, agricultural workers, au pairs, teachers and those entering under the 
Training and Work Experience Scheme. The work permit system has been subject to 
minor modifications since the 1970s, with a major revision in 2000.
6 The number of 
work permits issued fell from 75 thousand in 1969 to a low of 15 thousand in 1982, 
rising again to 80 thousand in 1999.  
  Migrants under the work permit system may obtain indefinite leave to remain 
or be accepted for settlement, and may eventually qualify for UK citizenship. Spouses 
and children of primary immigrants can also acquire the right to settle and work in 
Britain, subject to certain criteria. In some circumstances, the right to family 
reunification is extended to parents and grandparents and to fiancé(e)s. In 1998 20 
thousand entered as dependants of work-permit holders and another 50 thousand 
under the family reunification scheme.  
The other main groups of migrants to the UK are students and refugees. 
Students (not otherwise qualified for entry) are admitted if accepted for a course at a 
recognised educational institution, but without the right to work and only for the 
                                                            
4   Now renamed  Work Permits UK.  
5   Current regulations can be found at: http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/. 
6   On the system up to the late 1980s, see Salt and Kitching (1990); current arrangements are 
summarised in Glover et. al. (2001).. The recent changes involve some widening of the criteria based 
on skills educational qualifications and experience, as well as streamlining the applications procedure.   6 
duration of the course. Britain's policy towards asylum seekers (not directly 
considered here) is based on its obligation under the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 
1967 Protocol. Although the vast majority of asylum seekers have not been recognised 
as refugees, more than half have nevertheless been granted "exceptional leave to 
remain".  
Among the main destination countries for British immigrants there have been 
significant shifts in immigration policy since the 1960s. These include the abolition of 
preferences for immigrants from Britain and Europe, variations in total immigrant 
quotas, and the increasing use of selection by labour market characteristics, especially 
education and skills.
7 
  In Canada the preference given to immigrants from the UK, France, the US 
and certain Commonwealth countries was abolished in 1962 and replaced with a 
system based on four different categories: sponsored dependants, nominated relatives, 
refugees and asylum seekers, and independent migrants. The admission of assisted 
relatives and independent migrants is based on selection through the points system 
first established in 1967. In addition to having relatives in Canada, points are awarded 
for age, education, occupation, having pre-arranged employment, and fluency in 
English or French. This basic system was modified by the Immigration Acts of 1976, 
1988 and 1993. Administratively set targets for total admissions were sharply reduced 
in 1982-6 and then raised to over 200,000 in the 1990s. As a result the share admitted 
under the points system was reduced in the 1980s but increased again in the 1990s 
(Green and Green, 1995, 1999). Modifications to the points system further increased 
the skill selectivity of immigration policy in the 1990s and by 1994 nearly half of all 
immigrants were admitted principally on labour market characteristics. 
  From 1973 Australia abandoned so-called “white Australia” policy, which 
gave preference chiefly to immigrants from Britain and Ireland, in favour of a 
nondiscriminatory system similar to that of Canada. The targets for admission were 
also reduced during the 1970s and expanded subsequently but have varied from year 
to year depending on labour market conditions. The points system adopted in 1984 is 
applied to independent migrants, business migrants, those nominated by employers 
and those sponsored by relatives. The criteria put weight on occupations in demand, 
                                                            
7   Summaries of immigration policies in the major receiving countries can be found in Stalker 
(1994), UN (1998) and OECD (1998). On international migration law, see Plender (1987).  7 
education and experience. Over time, skill selectivity has increased and in the 1990s 
more than a third of migrants were selected on economic criteria.  
In New Zealand, similar policies have been followed since the weakening in 
1974, and abolition in 1987,of preferences for British and European immigrants. The 
points system adopted in 1991 stresses qualifications, age, experience, language skills 
and sponsored relatives. But, as compared with Australia, the New Zealand system 
has gone further in giving weight to general skills rather than to occupations in 
demand (Winkleman, 1999). In the 1990s, 65 percent of immigrants to New Zealand 
were points-tested. Both Australia and New Zealand operate a variable point score for 
admission that depends on labour market conditions.  
  In the United States the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality 
Act abandoned country quotas favouring western Europe, replacing this with an 
aggregate quota for the Eastern hemisphere as a whole. The quotas for the Eastern and 
western hemispheres were merged in 1978. Under the post-1965 system the 
overwhelming majority of visas were reserved for family reunification migrants, 
including non-immediate relatives. The 1990 Immigration Act expanded the number 
of employment-based visas from 54,000 to 140,000; nearly all of which were 
designated for skilled workers, and the total quota was increased by about 40 percent. 
But US immigration policy remains less skill-selective than that of the other 
traditional countries of immigration Under the system in operation since 1992 more 
than 70 percent of visas are still reserved for family members.  
   Like Britain, most of the countries receiving British immigrants operate 
programmes for temporary migration, often for the high-skilled or for occupations in 
demand. In Australia employer-nominated skilled workers are admitted for two years 
(renewable once), and in Canada for three years (renewable). In the United States the 
provision for admitting high skilled workers with H-1B visas for periods of up to three 
years (renewable once) was expanded under the 1990 Immigration Act. In all three 
countries and New Zealand fixed period visas are also issued under various schemes 
for study and work experience, for working holidays and for business personnel or 
those moving within the same firm.  
  Among other countries immigration policies vary too widely to discuss in 
detail. Most countries operate a system of work permits or passes, generally for 
restricted periods of time and sometimes subject to quotas. Often, immigrants require  8 
sponsorship from an employer or family member and the right to remain or to become 
a citizen is strictly circumscribed. In some cases, rules for immigrants differ by source 
country or ethnicity. In some countries, such as Japan, and in other parts of Asia, 
immigration controls are  relatively tight whereas in other cases such as in South 
America they are less restrictive.  
 
Migration and Selection 
  The effects of economic incentives on migration have been studied, notably by 
Sjaastad (1962), Borjas (1987) and Chiswick (2000). The basic framework laid out by 
Borjas has been widely used to analyse the average "quality" of the immigrant flow, 
but it has less often been applied to the quantity of immigration or emigration. Here I 
use a variation of this framework to examine the effects of relative incomes, income 
inequality, and selective immigration policy on the numbers of migrants or, more 
specifically, on the probability that individuals will migrate from one country to 
another.  
  In the source country, y, skill endowments follow a normal distribution: s ∼ N 
(µs, σs
2). The incomes that individual i (i = 1, …, n) receives at home in country y, and 
would receive if he/she were to migrate to country x, are: 
 
Income in destination: wxi = αx + βxsi, distributed as wx ~  N (µx, σx
2).  
(1) 
Income in origin: wyi = αy + βysi; distributed as wy ~ N (µy, σy
2).  
 
Thus incomes, and income inequality, differ in origin and destination but incomes in x 
are perfectly correlated with those in y across individuals in the origin country.  
  The costs of migration (including psychic costs) include three elements. 
Individual preferences for migration, in terms of equivalent income, zi, follow a 
normal distribution, z ∼ N(µz, σz
2), with mean, µz, and variance σz
2, where z is 
independent of s (Cov (s,z) = 0). zi is interpreted as an individual-specific cost or 
compensating differential and hence µz is assumed to be positive. This ensures that 
not everyone migrates in response to an income differential favouring the destination  9 
country. Factors such as having relatives in the destination country could be 
interpreted as lowering the costs of emigration by reducing the value of zi.  
  There is also a direct cost, c, which is the same for all migrants and may also 
reflect immigration policy: tougher immigration policy raises the cost of migration for 
all immigrants by increasing c. Selective immigration policies may also be used in the 
destination country to select by skill level. This is interpreted as raising the costs of 
emigration for the low skilled relative to the high-skilled. Selective immigration 
policy is reflected by γ(δ − si); the higher the individual's skill level, relative to a 
benchmark level, δ, the lower are the costs of migration. An increase in the skill-
selectivity of immigration policy in the destination country is represented by an 
increase in γ.  
  The probability that an individual, i, will migrate from country y to x, mi is: 
 
mi = Prob (wxi − wyi − zi − c − γ(δ − si) > 0) , or 
(2) 
mi = Prob (v > 0), where v = wxi − wyi − zi − c − γ(δ  − si)  
 











 − + + + + −
Φ − =
v
s z y x c
M
σ σ σ σ
µ µ µ µ δ δ δ δ γ γ γ γ µ µ µ µ µ µ µ µ µ µ µ µ ) (
1          ( 3 )  
 
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. Higher mean income in the 
destination or lower income in the source country increases the migration rate, as does 
a fall in the mean of  personal migration costs such as might be associated with a 
larger expatriate community.  
  The standard deviation of v, can be written as: 
 
s y s x y x z y x v γσ γσ γσ γσ σ σ σ σ γσ γσ γσ γσ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ γ γ γ γ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 − + − + + + =      ( 4 )  
  10 
The effects of changes in income distribution and the selectivity of immigration policy 
depend on the sign of the numerator in the bracketed term in (3) as well as on the sign 
of the derivative of σv with respect to σx, σy, and γ. Table 4 gives the conditions for 
these effects to be positive, holding the underlying skill distribution constant. 
  These results can be used to form predictions about the effects of changing 
income inequality for migration flows between countries with different characteristics. 
From the first row of table 4, if the destination country has sufficiently high relative 
income adjusted for migration costs (µx > µy + µz + c + γ(δ − µs), and it is sufficiently 
more equal (σx < σy − γσs) then an increase in destination inequality will increase 
immigration. Thus increasing inequality in Britain would tend to attract (relatively 
unskilled) migrants from countries that were sufficiently poor and unequal. By 
contrast if income in Britain (adjusted for immigration costs) is sufficiently low 
relative to, say, OECD countries, then increasing inequality will increase migration 
from these provided that British inequality is greater and/or immigration policy is 
sufficiently skill-selective. If neither of these cases hold then growing inequality will 
deter immigration.  
  The effects for origin countries are exactly the opposite. Thus increasing 
inequality in poor and unequal origin countries will tend to stem emigration if they are 
sufficiently unequal initially, and/or if selective immigration policy at the destination 
is sufficiently mild. Finally, it is possible to evaluate the effect of increasingly 
selective immigration policy though raising γ. These effects are more ambiguous, but 
a rise in γ could increase migration in certain circumstances.
8 For example if the 
destination is relatively rich and relatively equal, then for values of  γ and δ 
sufficiently large, greater policy selectivity will increase immigration. 
  
Data 
  The data on migration to and from Britain is from the International Passenger 
Survey, for which summary statistics were displayed earlier. The survey covers about 
0.2 percent of all travellers, only a fraction of whom are migrants Although the data is 
                                                            
8   The condition required for dM/dγ > 0 is: γ > (δ − µs)σv/v + (σx − σy)σs.   11 
subject to sampling error, non-response rates are relatively low.
9 Biases are most 
likely to arise because stated intentions may differ from actual behaviour (as in the 
case of asylum seekers or visa switchers) or because plans change. The survey results, 
grossed up using a complex weighting system, are published for the source destination 
countries listed in Table 1 above. Because of changes in the countries included in 
country groups, EU and non-EU Europe were merged, as were the Middle East and 
Other Foreign. This gives thirteen country or country groups over the period from 
1975 to 1998--a total of 312 country-year observations.  
  Series for real income per capita were obtained from the World Bank Global 
Development Network database.
 10 These are an updated version the Penn World 
Tables 5 and they are adjusted to purchasing power parities of 1990. Income for the 
country groups represented in the IPS statistics average were obtained by aggregating 
using (variable) population weights. Excluding the single countries and the aggregate 
of Bangladesh/India/Sri Lanka, the remaining six country groups are represented by 
107 individual countries. As with the aggregation of other variables discussed below, 
China, the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia and Ireland are excluded. A 
consistent annual series for the gini coefficient of equivalised household, post-tax 
incomes in the UK was provided by the Institute of Fiscal Studies.
11 Foreign income 
inequality was calculated from World Bank data, assembled by Deininger and Squire 
and augmented by the WIDER Institute.
12 The series used are those designated as 
"high quality" and are linearly interpolated between benchmark years as appropriate. 
The six multiple country groups represent a total of 82 countries and are each 
aggregated using current population.  
  Unemployment rates, which often feature in migration models, could only be 
obtained on a consistent basis for OECD countries. We therefore have a foreign 
unemployment index only for five of the thirteen country/groups, plus the UK. For 
                                                            
9   The 95 percent confidence interval for gross flows is about 5 percent. Clearly, it will be larger 
for net flows and for flows to and from specific destinations. But if migration is the left-hand side 
variable then sampling error will fall into the equation error term.  
10   Income and population data were obtained from: 
http://www.worldbank,org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm.  
11   I am grateful to Tom Clark who put this series together and kindly made it available to me. 
Further details and an analysis of trends in income equality (for 1979-97) are given in Clark and Taylor 
(1999).  
12   These data are available at: http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm. Certain adjustments 
were made according to whether the observations were for income/expenditure, gross/net income or  
individuals/households.  12 
Europe, unemployment series for 13 countries were combined using labour force 
weights.
13 Skill levels are represented by average years of schooling for those aged 25 
and over from the database of Barro and Lee.
14 Since the frequency is five years, the 
data for each country were linearly interpolated. The six country groups are 
represented by 129 individual countries and, as before, the countries in each group are 
weighted by current population. To capture the effects of expatriate communities in 
Britain we use the stock of foreign-born living in Britain in 1981 for each of the 
source countries or aggregates.
15 For the British living abroad we have similar figures 
for 1971, but only for the USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. 
For the other country groups, where the numbers of British-born are likely to be small, 
the value was set to zero.  
  These variables are used to explain the variation in net immigration for foreign 
citizens, and then for British citizens, before turning to net immigration for the two 
groups combined. 
 
Immigration of Foreign Citizens 
  Random effects panel estimates of immigration for the thirteen source areas by 
24 years appear in Table 5. Random effects exploits the cross-sectional variation in 
the data, as well as the time series variation, and these estimates are not rejected 
against the alternative of fixed effects. The variable for the foreign born stock in 1981 
has no time series variation and the dummies are specific to flows to and from Europe.  
Overall these estimates explain 44 percent of the variation for net immigration and 
two thirds of the variation for gross immigration. In light of the relatively high gross 
turnover, the emphasis here is chiefly on net immigration.  
  Cyclical variables clearly influence immigration, and this is reflected in the 
change in UK unemployment as well as the difference between unemployment rates at 
home and abroad. It should be noted that the unemployment differential (lagged one 
year) is defined to be zero for country groups outside North America, Australasia and 
Europe, but it seems plausible in any case that migration among developed countries 
would be more responsive to unemployment differentials. Both unemployment 
                                                            
13   These are taken from various issues of OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
14   These data, up to 1999 were found at http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata. 
15   These data are reported in OPCS International Migration, 198?.  13 
coefficients are negative and they imply that a one percentage point increase in UK 
unemployment reduces net immigration of foreign citizens by 11.1 thousand in the 
short run but by only 1.6 thousand in the long run.
16 
  The coefficients on relative income (log GDP ratio) and relative inequality 
(gini coefficient ratio) provide strong support for the model outlined above. The 
varying effect of relative inequality is captured by the interaction between relative 
income and relative inequality.
17 Both the log GDP per capita ratio and the ratio of the 
UK to foreign gini coefficients give positive coefficients but the interaction is 
negative. At the mean of the gini coefficient ratio (0.72) the overall coefficient on the 
GDP per capita implies that a ten percent increase in UK relative income per capita 
increases net immigration by 3.1 thousand. At the mean of the GDP per capita ratio 
(0.93), the effect of a rise in UK inequality is also positive, but the effect is modest. 
Thus a ten percent increase in the ratio of home to foreign inequality increases net 
immigration by 0.8 thousand. 
The overall positive effect of relative inequality is what would be expected 
from Table 4 if poor source countries are relatively less equal that the UK while rich 
source countries are relatively more equal than the UK. But while the correlation 
between log relative income and the gini coefficient ratio is negative, it is not strong: 
across the 13 country/group means the correlation coefficient is -0.15. This is because 
some of the relatively poor countries, for example, in Asia, are relatively equal, while 
others in Africa and South America are relatively unequal. The negative interaction 
term means that the positive effect of UK relative inequality gets smaller the poorer is 
the source country. The coefficients therefore imply strong positive selection from 
relatively developed countries.
18 For the five developed regions, a ten percent increase 
                                                            
16   These and other effects are calculated by multiplying the coefficients by the number of country 
groups in order to obtain the effects on total migration. For the unemployment differential the 
coefficient is multiplied by five, since it takes a value of zero for eight of the groups.  
17   The derivatives in Table 4 imply that the relationship between immigration and relative 
inequality should have an inverse ‘u’ shape when  the destination is relatively rich and a ‘u’ shape when 
the destination is relatively poor. An attempt was made to model this by including an additional term 
for the interaction between relative income and the square of relative inequality. This gives a quadratic 
relationship between immigration and inequality, which switches signs with the log of the GDP ratio. 
Although the two interaction terms took the expected signs (positive and negative respectively), they 
were highly collinear and therefore gave very low levels of significance.  
18   Borjas (1993) argued that the introduction in Canada, from the 1960s, of  policies that were 
more skill-selective in those in the United States led to a larger share of Canadian immigrants than of 
American immigrants coming from more developed regions. It seems that rising income inequality in 
Britain has gradually been producing a similar selection effect to that produced by policy in Canada.   14 
in relative UK/foreign inequality would increase immigration by 2.9 thousand. But for 
the other eight regions, the overall effect is negative so that immigration would 
decline by 2.1 thousand 
The effect of selective immigration control is represented by the term for the 
difference in years of education in the UK and the source country, which is introduced 
as a proxy for the term (δ − µs) in equation (3) above. For net immigration the 
coefficient is of the expected sign but insignificant, although it is larger and more 
significant for gross immigration. This suggests that British immigration control is 
weakly but positively skill-selective. More influential is the effect of the migrant 
stock. The coefficient for net migration implies that every thousand of the immigrant 
stock generates a further 119 immigrants each year. Clearly, this is the combined 
effect of lower costs of immigration faced by those with friends and relatives living in 
the UK and family reunification policy. It is notable, however that the effects are 
much larger for gross immigration, suggesting that the migrant stock generates higher 
flows in both directions.  
Finally, two dummies for Europe reflect the EU enlargements of 1986 and 
1995, each with a one year lag. While the former takes a small and insignificant 
coefficient the latter is surprisingly large, raising annual net immigration from Europe 
by nearly 24 thousand in 1996-8. This may reflect an initial inward surge, since the 
increase in gross immigration from 1987 was largely offset by a reverse flow. 
Nevertheless, the effects on gross immigration seem larger than would be expected 
from small enlargements and probably also reflect a general increase in mobility.  
 
Emigration of British Citizens 
Random effects panel estimates for British citizens for the 24 years and 13 
destinations appear in Table 6. These estimates explain about a third of the variation 
in net emigration and nearly a half of the variation in gross emigration. As with the 
estimates for foreign citizens, random effects is not rejected against the alternative of 
fixed effects.  
  Given that the left-hand side variable is for net emigration, the signs of the 
variables are expected to be the opposite of those in Table 5. The coefficients on the 
unemployment terms are positive as expected, but as for foreign citizens, the long run 
effects are relatively small. Thus a one percentage point increase in UK  15 
unemployment increases emigration of British citizens by 14.4 thousand in the short 
run and by 2.7 thousand in the long run.  
  The coefficients on the relative income and inequality terms offer further 
support for the model outlined above and they have the opposite signs to those for the 
immigration of foreign citizens in Table 5.  The total effect of relative income 
evaluated at the mean of the gini coefficient ratio is negative but small, implying that 
a 10 percent increase in UK relative income reduces emigration by 1.6 thousand. But 
relative inequality is much more powerful for British citizens than for foreign citizens. 
The gini coefficient ratio has an overall negative effect, which implies that a 10 
percent rise in relative inequality reduces emigration by 18.2 thousand.  
  The strong effect of inequality may be explained, at least in part by, in terms of 
the framework set out above. If the migration cost facing prospective British 
emigrants (as represented by  µz + c + γ(δ −µs) in equation (3)) is sufficiently positive,  
then even high income destinations will look relatively unattractive. And if they are 
also relatively equal (adjusted by the effect of selective immigration policy), then the 
effect of rising relative inequality at home will be negative for emigration. This would 
mean that the more skilled would be less likely to emigrate so that emigration would 
fall and emigrants would be less positively selected. The coefficients do tend to 
support this interpretation. They imply that a ten percent rise in UK relative inequality 
would reduce emigration to the five developed regions by 10.8 thousand and to the 
eight other regions by 7.5 thousand.  
  The relative human capital term is positive as expected but, as for the 
immigration of foreign citizens, it is small and insignificant. But to the extent that 
there is skill selection in immigration policies, this would partially offset the selection 
effects of rising UK inequality. Although skill-selection might be expected to apply 
especially to countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand, a dummy for these 
three countries interacted with the skill difference term proved to be highly 
insignificant. As with immigrants, the stock of UK born living abroad is more 
influential although only significant at the 10 percent level. The coefficient implies 
that each thousand of the British-born living abroad generates net emigration of 118 
British citizens per year--an effect almost identical to that in Table 5 for the 
immigration of foreign citizens. . Surprisingly though, the UK-born coefficient for 
gross emigration is smaller and not significant.   16 
  The dummies for country-specific policy changes give mixed results. Political 
change in South Africa has a negative but not significant effect. For Australia, the 
1978-98 dummy is positive, reflecting the increase in immigration targets in the later 
1970s, but a further dummy for the mid-1980s had no effect. For Canada, the sharp 
cut in immigration targets for 1982-6 is strongly reflected in the data but a dummy 
representing further expansion in 1993-8 was highly insignificant. Similarly for the 
United States, the expansion of the quota from 1992 has no significant effect. But for 
New Zealand the 1991 reforms had a weakly significant positive effect, contrary to 
what might have been expected.  
  The dummies for Europe from 1987 and 1996 tell a similar story to that for 
foreign citizens. From 1987 there was a large increase in the gross outflow but only a 
small and insignificant increase in the net flow. By contrast, from 1996 both the net 
and the gross outflows increased sharply. It remains to be seen whether this increase 
in emigration to Europe will be sustained in the longer term. 
 
Why has Net Immigration Increased? 
The results for British and foreign citizens show that the same influences have 
operated with opposite signs on foreign immigration and British emigration. In order 
to measure their impact on net immigration as a whole, Table 7 provides estimates for 
total net immigration. The country dummies for policy shifts in South Africa, the 
United States and New Zealand that were insignificant in Table 6 are excluded from 
the first column of Table 7. The dummies for Australia 1978-98, for Europe 1987-98, 
and for the stock of foreign born in the UK are dropped from the regression (also for 
net immigration) in the second column.  
  This more parsimonious specification gives results that are broadly consistent 
with what would be expected from those for the two separate groups in Tables 5 and 6 
above and do not require extensive comment. The only coefficient that is not 
significant at the conventional level is that for the difference in years of education, 
although it is stronger than for either of the individual groups. It is also notable that 
the overall effect of the dummy for Europe 1996-8 indicates that the net in-migration 
of foreign citizens dominates the net out-migration of British citizens. 
  The estimated coefficients in the second column in Table 7 are used to 
decompose the increase in aggregate immigration into the contributions of the  17 
different variables. Since the cross-sectional variation is highly influential in the 
random effects regression, it is important to see if these estimates can explain a major 
part of the variation over time in total net immigration. Two decompositions are 
presented in Table 8, based on applying the coefficients to the average values of the 
variables for five-year periods. Over the long term, 1975-9 to 1994-8, the predictions 
account for two thirds of the overall increase in net immigration of 94 thousand per 
annum. Similarly, for the decade 1984-8 to 1994-8 more than two thirds of the 50 
thousand increase is explained.  
  Unemployment was rising in the late 1970s but falling in the late 1990s and 
this accounts for a rise of six thousand per annum in net immigration over the long 
run. The modest increase in British GDP per capita, relative to the country groups in 
the data, produced an increase of 6.7 thousand per annum in net immigration. But by 
far the major effect stems from the trends in inequality, which accounts for a rise of 40 
thousand--two thirds of the explained increase and two fifths of the actual.  Across 
this period the UK gini coefficient rose by nearly ten percentage points (from 0.238 to 
0.334) while the average foreign gini increased by just one percentage point. Thus the 
dramatic effect of inequality was entirely due to rising UK inequality rather than to 
falling inequality abroad. The next largest effect is the Europe dummy, which added 
more than 7 thousand to the annual net inflow. 
  For the shorter period since the late 1980s the relative contributions are 
similar, but the unemployment effects are reversed.  Since UK unemployment was 
falling in both periods it has little effect on the overall change. But the decline in UK 
unemployment relative to the average abroad contributes 11 thousand to the rise in net 
immigration. The effect of rising relative income was to generate an extremely modest 
increase of 1.8 thousand. The effects of rising relative UK inequality, though smaller 
than over the longer run, still account for about half the of the explained and nearly 40 
percent of the observed rise in total net immigration. Finally the surge from Europe 




  Four main conclusions follow from the results presented in the preceding 
sections. They are as follows:  18 
•  Migration to and from Britain can largely be explained by economic variables. 
While immigration policies at home and abroad clearly do affect the volume of 
immigration and emigration, they do so by influencing, and presumably 
attenuating, the underlying forces driving migration. Such policies may 
themselves be influenced by economic conditions, but the notion that immigration 
is largely the result of exogenous policy shifts is simply not tenable.  
•  A simple empirical migration model, which includes income distribution, as well 
as factors such as relative income and unemployment, is supported by the data and 
gives results which accord closely to the predictions of the theory. 
•  The same model can account for both the inward flows of foreign citizens and the 
outward flow of British citizens, both gross and net, although the parameter values 
differ between the two groups.  
•  The model explains variance in the cross section and the time series and it predicts 
about two thirds of the rise in net migration since the 1970s. Although income and 
unemployment variables contribute to this explanation, the most important single 
cause of rising net immigration is the increase in inequality in Britain, which 
accounts for about 40 percent of the increase.  
What of the future? There has been much recent discussion of immigration and 
immigration policy in the light what is sometimes perceived to be an alarming trend. 
The results presented here suggest that the big surge since the early 1990s will not 
continue for many more years and that the long run upward trend will moderate, for 
the following reasons: 
•  Britain's strong economic performance relative to other OECD countries during 
the 1990s is unlikely to be repeated as UK unemployment falls more slowly, and 
other countries' unemployment rates fall further. And UK per capita income seems 
unlikely to grow substantially faster relative to income abroad than it did in the 
1990s. 
•  UK income inequality has stopped rising, or is rising only slowly and unless it 
resumes an upward trend, one of the key underlying drivers of the long-run 
upward march of net immigration will be absent.   19 
•  The surge from Europe in the late 1990s is likely to be counterbalanced by larger 
net flows in the opposite direction, as was the case from the late 1980s. But 
European enlargement could generate significant inward surges in the future.  
It seems appropriate to conclude on a note of caution. This study is the first attempt 
comprehensively to account for cross-section and time series variation in net 
migration to and from Britain. The findings presented here will no doubt be modified 
and refined by future research. But there are major limitations on what can be 
achieved with the limited data available and improvements in the published migration 
data are badly needed. From a research perspective, further effort should also be made 
to characterise immigration policies and to examine the effects of policy not only on 
the number of immigrants but on the flow of human capital.   20 
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Table 1 
UK Net Migration by Country of Origin or Destination 
(Thousands per decade) 
 
 1969-78  1979-88  1989-98 
Commonwealth       
Australia  −286.3  −187.1     −52.3 
Canada  −112.2     −71.4     −15.3 
New Zealand    −63.3      −3.4    +24.6 
South Africa    −99.3      −8.6  +45.2 
Other African  Commonwealth    +76.1    +48.4  +56.6 
Bangladesh, India,  Sri Lanka  +124.0  +111.8    +93.1 
Pakistan     +46.1
1    +87.5    +59.2 
Caribbean Commonwealth       −4.5
3      +5.0      +5.4 
Other Commonwealth    +56.6    +17.5    +34.9 
Foreign      
European Union      −56.9
4      +29.5
5     +133.7
6 
Rest of Europe    −18.1      −7.2    +19.1 
United States    −21.7     −75.5     −19.8 
Rest of America      +5.6      −2.0      −6.8 
Middle East       +54.3
2}     −55.1      +0.6 
Other Foreign                 }    +39.1    +77.9 
 
Source: OPCS International Migration, 1978, 1988, 1998. 
Notes:  (1) From 1973 only; (2) Includes Pakistan 1968-72; (3) West Indies only; (4) Coverage reflects 
enlargement in 1973; (5) Reflects enlargement in 1981 and 1986; (6) As constituted in 1995. 
 
Table 2 
Gross and Net Migration Flows 
(Thousands per decade) 
 
 1969-78  1979-98  1989-98 
All Nationalities       
       Gross Immigration   1970.4  2037.3  2600.3 
       Gross Emigration   2421.2  2092.6  2139.9 
       Net Immigration   −480.8     −55.3    460.4 
UK Citizens       
       Gross Immigration     860.3    910.8  1036.5 
       Gross Emigration   1717.1  1365.7  1259.4 
       Net Immigration   −857.1  −454.9  −222.9 
Foreign Citizens       
       Gross Immigration   1110.1  1126.5  1563.8 
       Gross Emigration     704.1    726.9    880.5 
       Net Immigration     406.0    399.6    683.3 
 
Source: OPCS International Migration, 1978, 1988, 1998.  23 
Table 3 
Net Immigration by Age and Occupational Status 
(Thousands per decade) 
 
  1969-78  1979-88  1989-98 
Sex     
Male  −266.3   −88.7  +174.6 
Female  −184.8   +33.3  +285.5 
Age     
<15  −138.1     +13.4     +60.0 
15-24    +42.9  +122.1  +321.4 
25-44  −301.8  −126.8     +70.8 
>45    −50.2     −63.7     +14.6 
Occupation (adults)     
Professional/Managerial  −106.1     −45.8  +101.4 
Manual/Clerical          −313.9  −126.3    +53.2 
Students  +169.2     +51.7 +151.2 
Other Adults (unoccupied)    −63.3    +40.2    +94.8 
 
Source: OPCS, International Migration, 1978, 1988, 1998. 





Effects of Income Distribution on Migration 
 
Effect on migration rate  
of:  
Destination is "relatively 
rich":  
µx > µy + µz + c − γ(µs − δ) 
Destination is "relatively 
poor":  
µx < µy + µz + c − γ(µs − δ) 
Income distribution in 
destination country 
      dM/dσx > 0 
      if: σx < σy − γσs 
      dM/dσx > 0 
      if: σx > σy − γσs 
Income distribution in 
source country  
      dM/dσy > 0 
      if: σy < σx + γσs 
      dM/dσy > 0 
      if: σy > σx + γσs 
  24 
 
Table 5 
Immigration of Foreign Citizens 
Random Effects Panel Estimates, 1975-98 
 
        Net        Gross 
Constant 
 
      −3.99 
      (1.66) 
      −2.43 
      (0.66) 
Change in UK unemployment rate 
 
      −0.73 
      (2.14) 
      −0.79 
      (2.60) 
Relative unemployment rate 
      (UK minus foreign, t-1) × developed 
      −0.31 
      (1.84) 
      −0.79 
      (2.60) 
Log GDP per capita ratio 
      (UK to foreign) 
        6.08 
      (3.46) 
        4.75 
      (2.26) 
Gini coefficient ratio 
      (UK to foreign) 
        5.36 
      (2.02) 
      10.39 
      (4.28) 
Log GDP per capita ratio × 
      Gini coefficient ratio 
      −5.13 
      (2.90) 
      −6.66 
      (4.12) 
Years of schooling difference 
      (UK minus foreign) 
      −0.28 
      (0.73) 
      −0.73 
      (1.69) 
Foreign-born population in UK, 
       1981 
        9.18 
      (1.77) 
      26.49 
      (2.26) 
Europe 1987-98 
 
        2.43 
      (1.45) 
      13.33 
      (8.85) 
Europe 1996-8 
 
       23.43 
      (9.78) 
      25.31 
    (11.70) 
R
2  Within          0.38          0.64 
      Between          0.56          0.68 
      Overall          0.45          0.67 
Breusch-Pagan χ
2
(1)      155.21    1462.05 
Hausman χ
2
(9)          2.60          0.53 
No. of observations       312      312 
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Table 6 
Emigration of UK Citizens 
Random Effects Panel Estimates, 1975-98 
 
        Net        Gross 
Constant 
 
      16.19 
      (4.35) 
      20.18 
      (4.94) 
Change in UK unemployment rate 
 
        0.90 
      (1.78) 
        1.68 
      (3.77) 
Relative unemployment rate 
      (UK minus foreign, t-1) × developed 
        0.54 
      (1.93) 
        0.82 
      (3.30) 
Log GDP per capita ratio 
      (UK to foreign) 
      −6.41 
      (2.36) 
      −6.47 
      (2.51) 
Gini coefficient ratio 
      (UK to foreign) 
    −20.75 
      (5.19) 
    −13.33 
      (3.63) 
Log GDP per capita ratio × 
      Gini coefficient ratio 
        7.25 
      (2.29) 
        3.12 
      (1.32) 
Years of schooling difference 
      (UK minus foreign) 
        0.18 
      (0.26) 
        0.52 
      (0.72) 
UK-born population overseas, 
       1971 
        9.09 
      (1.89) 
        6.38 
      (1.03) 
South Africa 1991-8 
 
      −3.94 
      (1.47) 
      −3.58 
      (1.45) 
Australia 1978-98 
 
        6.18 
      (2.15) 
        3.47 
      (1.28) 
Canada 1982-6 
 
      −9.16 
      (3.37) 
      −9.12 
      (3.76) 
USA 1992-8 
 
      −1.16 
      (0.50) 
        2.02 
      (0.96) 
New Zealand 1991-8 
 
        4.44 
      (1.81) 
        5.53 
      (2.51) 
Europe 1987-98 
 
       1.57 
      (0.64) 
      17.39 
      (7.96) 
Europe 1996-8 
 
      13.21 
      (3.78) 
      11.70 
      (3.78) 
R
2  Within          0.19          0.31 
      Between          0.53          0.49 
      Overall          0.32          0.45 
Breusch-Pagan χ
2
(1)        79.20      756.81 
Hausman χ
2
(13)          6.46          1.40 
No. of observations      312      312 
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Table 7 
Total Net Immigration (UK and foreign) 
Random Effects Panel Estimates, 1975-98 
 
        Net        Net 
Constant 
 
    −13.85 
      (3.72) 
    −14.33 
      (3.94) 
Change in UK unemployment rate 
 
      −1.39 
      (2.19) 
      −1.43 
      (2.29) 
Relative unemployment rate 
      (UK minus foreign, t-1) × developed 
      −0.64 
      (2.02) 
      −0.70 
      (2.29) 
Log GDP per capita ratio 
      (UK to foreign) 
      10.78 
      (3.91) 
      11.14 
      (4.10) 
Gini coefficient ratio 
      (UK to foreign) 
       21.28 
      (4.61) 
      22.23 
      (5.15) 
Log GDP per capita ratio × 
      Gini coefficient ratio 
      −8.32 
      (2.72) 
      −8.86 
      (2.96) 
Years of schooling difference 
      (UK minus foreign) 
      −1.00 
      (1.76) 
      −0.70 
      (1.87) 
Foreign-born population in UK, 
       1981 
    −14.30 
      (3.71) 
    −14.93 
      (5.12) 
UK-born population overseas, 
       1971 
      −0.37 
      (0.08) 
         -- 
Australia 1978-98 
 
      −0.32 
      (0.11) 
         -- 
Canada 1982-6 
 
        8.85 
      (2.59) 
        9.19 
      (2.75) 
Europe 1987-98 
 
        1.64 
      (0.53) 
         -- 
Europe 1996-8 
 
      11.04 
      (2.42) 
      11.76 
      (2.73) 
R
2  Within          0.21          0.21 
      Between          0.85          0.84 
      Overall          0.45          0.45 
Breusch-Pagan χ
2
(1)          2.75          2.81 
Hausman χ
2
(10,8)        16.28        13.70 
No. of observations      312      312 
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Table 8 
Effects on Total Net Immigration  
(thousands per annum) 
 
  1975-9 to 1994-8  1984-8 to 1994-8 
Change in UK unemployment rate          5.9          0.1 
Relative unemployment rate        −1.0        11.1 
Log GDP per capita ratio          6.7          1.8 
Gini coefficient ratio        40.4        18.8 
Years of schooling difference          4.8          3.0 
Canada 1982-6           --        −5.5 
Europe 1996-8          7.1          7.1 
Explained total        63.9        36.4 
Actual total        94.2        50.4 
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